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YATES v. AIKEN
108 S.Ct. 534 (1988)
In an opinion for a unanimous Court written by Justice
Stevens, the U.S. Supreme Court held: "1) the retroactive ap-
plication of Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965,
85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985), to invalidate conviction due to improper
burden-shifting instruction was approprite, and 2) after con-
sidering merits of federal claim, the South Carolina Supreme
Court could not refuse to apply the rule of federal constitu-
tional law on the ground that it had authority to establish the
scope of its own habeas corpus proceedings. Reversed and
Remanded.
FACTS
Dale Robert Yates, petitioner, was tried and convicted in the
General Sessions Court of Greenville County, South Carolina of
murder, armed robbery, assault and battery with the intent to
kill and conspiracy. Petitioner was subsequently sentenced to
death.
Petitioner and an accomplice robbed a country store in
1981. After the robbery the petitioner left the store. Shortly
thereafter a fight broke out, while the petitioner remained out-
side, in which his accomplice and the storekeeper's mother were
both killed. Petitioner testified at trial that the decedent had not
even entered the store before he left and that he had no inten-
tion to kill or harm anyone.
At trial the jury was instructed by the trial court that
"malice is implied or presumed from the use of a deadly
weapon."
CASE HISTORY
Petitioner appealed his conviction to the South Carolina
Supreme Court where his conviction was affirmed. State v.
Yates, 280 S.C. 29, 310 S.E.2d 805 (1982), cert. denied, 462
U.S. 1124, 103 S.Ct. 3098, 77 L.Ed.2d 1356 (1983). A few
months after this affirmation, the South Carolina Supreme
Court decided in State v. Elmore, 279 S.C. 417, 308 S.E.2d 781
(1983), that it was error to give such an instruction. Petitioner
then sought a writ of habeas corpus from the South Carolina
Supreme Court, arguing that the burden-shifting instruction
given at his trial was unconstitutional under the decision held in
Elmore and under the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Sand-
strom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39
(1979). The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits jury instructions that have the effect of relieving the
State of its burden of proof on the critical question of intent in
a criminal prosecution. The State must prove every element of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. While Yates' petition was
pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided another case involv-
ing a burden-shifting jury instruction, which petitioner called to
the attention of the court. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307,
105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985). The South Carolina
Supreme Court however denied the writ without opinion.
Petitioner then sought certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court.
The High Court vacated the judgment of the South Carolina
Supreme Court and remanded the case "for further considera-
tion in light of Francis v. Franklin." Yates v. Aiken, 474 U.S.
896, 106 S.Ct. 218, 88 L.Ed.2d 218 (1985).
On remand the South Carolina Supreme Court held that
petitioner was not entitled to relief because Elmore (the state
case) could not be applied retroactively. The court did not
discuss the two recent U.S. Supreme Court cases, Sandstrom
and Francis.
Again, petitioner sought relief from the U.S.. Supreme
Court. Certiorari was granted since the South Carolina Supreme
Court had not fully complied with the Court's previous order.
Yates v. Aiken, 480 U.S. - 107 S.Ct. 1601, 94 L.Ed.2d 788
(1987).
HOLDING
The Supreme Court has determined that "The Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which
he is charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct.
1068, 1072, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). The Court relied on this
foundation in determining Sandstrom and Francis and further
instructed the state court to do the same when reviewing the
petitioner's case. Since the South Carolina Supreme Court
refused to address the federal constitutional issues the U.S.
Supreme Court was compelled to answer the question.
The South Carolina Attorney General argued that Francis
should not apply to this case because petitioner's case was
decided prior to the Court's decision. The Supreme Court re-
jected this argument stating that Francis was only a restatement
of the law previously decided in the Sandstrom case, therefore
it is not subject to attack by the State Attorney General. The
Court reiterated that the burden is on the State to prove all the
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
The second issue before the Court was that South Carolina
claimed authority to establish the scope of its own habeas cor-
pus proceedings and to refuse to apply a new rule of federal
constitutional law retroactively. The Court dismissed this claim
on two grounds. First, the decision in Francis was not new law
and second, the collateral attack was based on the federal con-
stitution and the states have a duty to grant relief that federal
law requires.
APPLICATION TO VIRGINIA
Attorneys who are representing defendants on state and
federal habeas corpus petitions should be aware that not all
favorable decisions that come after the defendant's conviction
are given retroactive effect. However, some of the decisions are
retroactive and the defendant has in any event the right to the
benefit of the law as it was at the time of his conviction (note,
the Court said Franklin was not new law, only a restatement).
There is a lesson to be learned: Attorneys pursuing a habeas
corpus petition must be aware of all subsequent federal law that
could possibly apply in the case. Rights to argue those issues
should be claimed if there is any reasonable possibility that the
client is covered by the subsequently announced law.
Attorney's should carefully review the jury instructions they
use at trial and to review the ones the Commonwealth offers.
In Virginia there is a jury instruction very similar to the one in
Yates:
Instruction No. 34.240
Inference of Malice - Use of Deadly Weapon
You may infer malice from the deliberate use of a deadly
weapon unless, from all the evidence, you have a reasonable
doubt as to whether malice existed.
A "deadly weapon" is any object or instrument that is like-
ly to cause death or great bodily injury because of the manner,
and under the circumstances, in which it is used.
This instruction would probably pass a constitutional test
since the language allows the jury to consider all the evidence
presented and then draw their own conclusions. The instruction
does not require that the jury come to one conclusion unless
defendant disproves malice.
There is another instruction used in Virginia that does come




You may infer that every person intends the natural and
probable consequence of his acts.
The language of the instruction says the jury "may infer"
though it does not instruct the jury to consider any of the
evidence in making this inference. The U.S. Supreme Court is
clear that the burden is on the State to prove all the elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. A strong argument could
be made that this instruction is unconstitutional as written, at
least without the exploratory phrase "but need not" following
the word "may." (Elizabeth P. Murtagh)
LOWENFIELD v. PHELPS
108 S.Ct. 546 (1988)
FACTS
A Louisiana trial court found Lowenfield guilty of two
counts of manslaughter and three counts of first degree murder.
An essential element in the definition of the first degree murder
offense was identical to the sentencing phase aggravating factor
of intention "to kill or inflict great bodily harm upon more
than one person." La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:30(A)(3) (West
1986). Before the jury began sentencing deliberations the trial
judge gave the jury instructions. After the jury failed to reach a
unanimous verdict, the judge twice polled the jury to assess the
benefit of continued deliberation. The judge subsequently re-
instructed the jury, the jury returned for further deliberation,
and thereafter returned a death verdict. Defense counsel did not
object to either the polling or supplemental charge. The Loui-
siana Supreme Court upheld Lowenfield's convinction. 495
So.2d 1245. The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana denied relief, and the United States Court
of Appeals Fifth Circuit affirmed. 817 F.2d 285
(CA5 1987).
HOLDING
a) Supplemental charge by judge did not constitute coercion.
Lowenfield claimed that the jury was improperly coerced by
the judge's supplemental charge. Lowenfield v. Phelps, 108
S.Ct. 546, 550. The Supreme Court majority, however, found
that because the object of the jury system is to reach unanimity
by weighing contrasting views, "the use of a supplemental
charge has long been sanctioned." Id. The petitioner also urged
that because unanimity was not required to reach a proper
sentence, in that the Louisiana legislature provides that if a jury
could not agree the court shall impose a life sentence, La. Code
Crim. Proc. Ann. Art. 905.8 (West 1984), the second charge
was impermissable under the Fourteenth and Eighth Amend-
ments of the United States Constitution. Lowenfield, 108 S.Ct.
at 551. The Court concluded that the state had a strong interest
in having the jury express the will of the community as to peti-
tioner's sentence, and not to use the legislature default
mechanism. Id.
b) The polling of the jury did not exacerbate the coercion.
Lowenfield claimed that the polling of the jury exacerbated
the coercive effect of the supplemental charge. Id. at 552. The
Court's view was that since the judge's inquiry into the
numerical division of the jury questioned how the jurors felt
about further deliberation, and did not go to the merits of the
case, the polling did not effect the constitutionality of the
sentence. Although the jury handed down the final verdict soon
after the supplemental instruction, defense counsel did not ob-
ject to either the polling or supplemental instruction at the time.
Although petitioner waived no rights by this inaction, the omis-
sion was said to indicate that the petitioner did not perceive, as
readily apparent, the potential for coercion. Id.
c) Duplication of element of the offense and aggravating factor
